Editorial 1: Zero stars

Context

Making the Sanchar Saathi app mandatory to fight cybercrime is excessive.
 

Introduction

The rapid rise of sophisticated cybercrimes—from digital arrests to cross-border scams- has exposed critical security gaps in SIM-linked messaging accounts and IMEI tracking. In response, the government has introduced stricter telecom directives, including SIM binding and the mandatory Sanchar Saathi app. While intended to improve safety, these measures raise serious concerns about privacy, surveillance, and proportionality.

Rising Cybercrime Complexity

• The increasing sophistication of cybercrimes -  from digital arrests to large-scale, anonymous, cross-border scams - has made prevention both urgent and challenging.
• Criminals exploit a loophole where messaging accounts remain active even after SIM removal, enabling government-impersonation fraud.
• Widespread use of spoofed or tampered IMEI numbers further limits law-enforcement’s ability to trace offenders.

Government’s Response via New Directives

• To address software and hardware vulnerabilities, the DoT issued two directives: one mandating SIM binding(accounts disabled when SIM is removed), and another requiring pre-installation of the Sanchar Saathi app on all new smartphones by March 2026.
• While SIM binding acts as a security patch, the mandatory app risks becoming a case where good intentions lead to harmful outcomes, especially regarding device authenticity checks.

Concerns Over Intrusiveness and Surveillance

• The directive insists the app must be visible, accessible, and not disabled, implying it will receive high-level system permissions, potentially accessing the camera, phone and SMS functions.
• This raises serious concerns of state surveillance or exploitation by malicious actors - fears reinforced by past incidents such as the alleged use of Pegasus against journalists, activists and opposition figures.

Privacy, Proportionality and Alternatives

• Although officials claim the app can be deleted, the directive’s language suggests otherwise, making it function more like a Panopticon than a simple verification tool.
• Under the K.S. Puttaswamy (2017) ruling, any intrusion into privacy must meet tests of legality, necessity and proportionality — standards this directive does not satisfy.
• Since less intrusive options already exist (Sanchar Saathi web portal, SMS verification, and USSD codes), the mandatory pre-installation is disproportionate.
• Unsurprisingly, privacy-focused companies such as Apple have reportedly refused to comply with the order.

Conclusion

Although the government aims to curb fraud through tighter device verification and security controls, the mandatory Sanchar Saathi app risks creating excessive intrusion and potential misuse. With less invasive alternatives already available, the directive struggles to meet the standards of necessity and proportionality. Protecting citizens from cybercrime must not compromise their fundamental privacy rights.