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11 Dec 2025 : A verdict that is an abdication of judicial function

 Editorial 1: A verdict that is an abdication of judicial function

Context

The reluctance of the top court to set or evolve a time-frame for constitutional functionaries risks undermining constitutional morality.

 

Introduction

The Supreme Court’s judgment in the 16th Presidential Reference has drawn both criticism and praise, with its implications examined in depth. At the heart of the debate lies the question of setting timelines for the duties of high constitutional authorities. Although the Court’s reasoning reflects judicial restraint and respect for the Constitution’s text, it also appears to sidestep its essential role of interpreting the Constitution in light of evolving circumstances. Such reluctance sits uneasily with an institution vested with expansive judicial review powers.

  • It is well recognised that the Constitution of India does not prescribe specific timelines for the actions expected from authorities such as the President, Governors, and Speakers.
  • In the case of Speakers of Parliament and State Assemblies, they also function as quasi-judicial authorities responsible for deciding defection cases under the Tenth Schedule.
  • However, the Constitution provides no fixed time-frame for completing these defection proceedings, leaving the process open-ended.


An anomaly

  • This situation creates a constitutional anomaly: although Assemblies and Parliament have a fixed five-year term, the absence of any timeline for ruling on defection petitions means an elected member could theoretically complete an entire term without ever facing the consequences of defection.
  • This gap has recently surfaced in multiple States, undermining the very purpose of the anti-defection law.
  • A similar concern arises with Governors, whose decisions to withhold or delay legislative business have triggered repeated disputes.
  • This was never the intention of the Constitution or its framers, who did not envisage gubernatorial actions being used to stall duly passed legislation indefinitely.
  • The issue is not whether Governors may return Bills for reconsideration, but whether they can withhold assent indefinitely, effectively neutralising a law passed by the legislature - something they cannot constitutionally do.
  • Only constitutional courts possess the authority to strike down legislative or executive actions that are ultra vires.

 

The irony in the verdict

  • Ironically, the Presidential Reference verdict supports the view that no timelines should be imposed on constitutional functionaries.
  • The Court reasons that since Article 200 contains no explicit timeline, none should be inferred - a stance that effectively validates Governors’ delays in granting assent to Bills passed by elected Assemblies.
  • This approach goes beyond merely surrendering judicial review powers; it overlooks how constitutional silence can be manipulated to undermine the Constitution’s foundational ideals.
  • The Court, instead, could have interpreted this silence in a way that protected constitutional morality, ensuring that the Constitution cannot be subverted through delay.
  • In his well-known speech of November 4, 1948, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar urged that constitutional morality be woven into the Republic’s framework and internalised by its citizens.
  • This doctrine has gained importance in recent judicial reasoning, with landmark rulings - including those on women’s entry into Sabarimala and LGBTQIA+ rights - relying on constitutional morality to interpret the text in harmony with public conscience.

 

A pointer

  • Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s call for constitutional morality was accompanied by a clear warning to future courts.
  • He stressed that the form of administration is deeply linked to the form of the Constitution, cautioning that the Constitution could be subverted simply by altering administrative practices.
  • Instances such as Speakers delaying decisions on defection cases and Governors withholding assent to Bills beyond an Assembly’s tenure perfectly illustrate this constitutional distortion.
  • Ambedkar also grappled with how much administrative detail should be embedded in the Constitution, recognising the risk of leaving too many specifics to future legislatures.
  • Yet he placed faith in later generations - and especially in the courts - to uphold the Constitution’s foundational values and prevent any erosion of its core principles.

 

Conclusion

From any perspective, the Court’s reluctance to prescribe or craft a time-frame for key constitutional functionaries risks producing outcomes that ultimately weaken the very system it seeks to protect. Such consequences run counter to the foundational ideals of the Constitution and underscore how far we remain from fully internalising the constitutional morality envisioned by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar.