Editorial 1: The paradox of the approach to the Manipur issue

Context

The position on this, which is also a national security issue, is troubling.

Introduction

As the deadlock in Manipur reaches two years, the long wait for a political solution still seems out of reach. Even after causing massive destruction, the death of over 250 people, and forcing thousands to live in poor relief camps, the violence in Manipur has not been treated as a top national priority. This is painfully clear as Prime Minister Narendra Modi continues to avoid visiting the State or offering a clear plan to end the crisis. This stands in sharp contrast to the quick and serious response he gave to the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, which even led him to cut short his Saudi Arabia trip and announce policy steps.

India-Pakistan Stand-off vs. Manipur Crisis

• The brief military stand-off between India and Pakistan received a swift response.
• This action reflected the strong public sentiment that:
  • Terrorist infrastructure across the Line of Control must be destroyed, and
  • Pakistan should be punished for its alleged role in cross-border terrorism.
• As the ceasefire terms and diplomatic negotiations between the two nuclear powers stay in the spotlight,
  it is highly unlikely that:
  • Manipur’s ongoing human tragedy and
  • The political deadlock will receive the serious national attention they truly deserve.

The approach to the northeast

• There is a clear difference in how New Delhi treats Manipur compared to Kashmir.
• This reflects a broader pattern in India’s Northeast policy, driven more by:
  • National security concerns, and
  • Regime preservation, rather than local realities.

Key Differences: Manipur vs Kashmir

Recent Developments in Manipur: A Closer Look

• Civil society and security experts attempted to blame Kuki militants:
  • Example: In Sept 2024, CM’s office cited “credible inputs” warning about 900 militants with rocket launchers.
  • This was used to justify strikes on Kuki-Zomi-Hmar villages.
• However, real threats remain underplayed, especially:
  • The rise of Valley-Based Insurgent Groups (VBIGs) since May 3, 2023.
  • These groups are being used to maintain law and order as the State fails to protect certain villages.
• The ‘buffer zone’, created after Home Minister Amit Shah’s visit in May 2023, divides:
  • The Meitei-dominated valleys, and
  • The Kuki-Zomi-Hmar hill regions.

Policy Shortcomings

• New Delhi’s focus remains on political optics, not real reform.
• Missed opportunities since Operation All-Clear (2004):
  • No major improvement in intelligence gathering,
  • Lack of counterinsurgency upgrades,
  • Stalled modernisation of the police and army.

The case of fencing as an obsolete outlook

• New Delhi is aggressively pushing to:
  • Scrap the Free Movement Regime (FMR) with Myanmar.
  • Spend over ₹31,000 crore to fence the 1,643 km India-Myanmar border, including the 398 km stretch in Manipur.
• This hardline stance reflects:
  • An outdated view of security.
  • A response to majoritarian insecurities from valley-based groups.
  • A political move aligned with pork-barrel politics, benefiting contractors and brokers.
• Naga and Mizo groups have shown strong opposition, exposing deep divisions in the region.

Key Concerns Around Border Fencing Policy

Superficial Security Moves and Arms Mismanagement

• National security policy is driven more by optics than real reforms:
  • Arms surrender ceremonies are public shows, not backed by sincere disarmament efforts.
  • Of 6,020 stolen arms, only about 4,000 returned so far.
  • As of March 6, 2025, 894 arms were surrendered after Governor Ajay Kumar Bhalla's deadlines.
• Example of hollow optics:
  • On Feb 27, the Arambai Tenggol militia held a weapon surrender parade with 246 weapons.
  • Many were country-made guns, raising doubts about the seriousness of the act.
  • No strong legal action has followed the surrender deadlines.

Consequences of Weak Security Policy

• The abundant availability of arms and lack of credible State response keeps the ethnic security dilemma alive.
• President’s Rule, imposed on Feb 13, 2025, followed a BJP rebellion and leadership change.
  • Sent a symbolic warning to all armed groups that violence won’t be tolerated.
  • However, real enforcement and reforms remain lacking.

Conclusion

A slow but steady return to normal might lead to serious political talks with opposing groups, in a way that respects real demands and builds trust in government institutions. While rival parties marked May 3 differently — one calling it ‘separation day’ and the other a ‘day of remembrance and reflection’ — to support their political agendas, solving the political deadlock and restoring law and order will need real policy changes that go beyond show politics and power preservation.