Editorial 1: The new normal after Pahalgam, India’s response

Context

India needs to strengthen its broad ‘new normal’ strategy so that it becomes a strong and believable warning against future terrorist attacks.

Introduction

Operation Sindoor is currently on ‘pause’, and although the ceasefire started off a bit unstable on Saturday evening (May 10), it appears to be holding steady. On May 12, the two Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMO) — from India and Pakistan — had a follow-up talk and discussed more steps to reduce tension, including cutting down troop numbers in the frontline areas where there had been a recent buildup.

• On Monday evening (May 12), Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the nation.
• He declared that “Operation Sindoor has redefined the fight against terror… setting a new benchmark and a new normal in counter-terrorism measures.”
• Kinetic retaliation — using direct military force — is not new.
• The Modi government had earlier conducted:
  • Surgical strikes across the Line of Control (LoC) in 2016, after the Uri attack.
  • An air strike on a Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) camp in Balakot in 2019, following the Pulwama suicide attack.
• However, the response to Pahalgam was qualitatively different, marking a shift in strategy.

India’s Response to the Pahalgam Attack (April–May 2025)

Background & Initial Response

• After the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, 2025, it was clear India would retaliate.
• The only questions were timing and method.
• Initial non-military actions included:
  • Reducing diplomatic presence
  • Suspending trade
  • Closing the Wagah-Attari border
  • Cancelling visas
  • Putting the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance
• However, these were not substitutes for kinetic retaliation.

Planning for Kinetic Action (April 23 – May 7)

• The two-week period was used to:
  • Select military targets
  • Coordinate high-level diplomacy
• Nine targets were finalized from ~24 options.
• Anticipation of a major terror attack post-2019 led to regular planning updates.
• Diplomatic groundwork was laid with key global capitals to ensure conditional support for India's actions.

Execution of Operation Sindoor (May 7, 2025)

• Early morning strike on May 7 targeted nine terror-linked sites.
• Pakistan’s DGMO was informed post-strike.
• Targets were tied to LeT, JeM, and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.
• India stressed the strike was only against terrorists, not Pakistan’s military or civilians.
• India warned of retaliation if Pakistan escalated.

Key Actions and Developments

Weapons Used by India on May 10

• Scalp, BrahMos missiles
• Crystal Maze, Hammer, Spice 2000 precision-guided munitions
• Heavy backchannel diplomacy led by Washington, Delhi, and Islamabad.
• Ceasefire declared on May 10 at 5 p.m. after DGMO communication.
• Pakistan tried to save face, claimed success but offered a de-escalation path.
• India followed its “quid pro quo plus” policy but remained open to a ceasefire.

U.S. Role in the India-Pakistan Escalation (May 2025)

Initial U.S. Stance

• The United States initially maintained a hands-off approach.
• On May 8, U.S. Vice-President J.D. Vance stated:
  • The U.S. would not get involved “in the middle of a war that is fundamentally none of our business.”

Shift in U.S. Assessment

• Within 24 hours, the U.S. position shifted due to:
  • Intelligence of impending cross-border strikes
  • Reports that Pakistan was preparing to convene its National Command Authority (NCA) — the body responsible for nuclear oversight.

High-Level Diplomatic Engagement

Historical Context of U.S. Involvement

• Since 1998, the U.S. has helped de-escalate multiple India-Pakistan crises:
  • Kargil War (1999)
  • Indian Parliament attack and Operation Parakram (2001–02)
  • Mumbai attacks (2008)
  • Balakot airstrikes (2019)
• Exception: After the 2016 surgical strikes, which Pakistan denied, the U.S. did not intervene.
• Pattern: U.S. involvement has been limited to de-escalation, not direct mediation.

Conflict under the nuclear shadow

• Since 1998, after both India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed states, Pakistan has relied on nuclear threatsto limit India’s conventional military options.
• This nuclear posturing aimed to reduce space for kinetic retaliation by flashing the nuclear card and threatening early nuclear use after terrorist attacks.
• However, this strategy is no longer effective. Over time, India has progressively expanded its kinetic response doctrine:
  • The 2016 surgical strikes introduced ground-based retaliation as the new normal.
  • The 2019 Balakot air strikes expanded this by incorporating air power.
  • Operation Sindoor (2025) took it further by striking targets across all of Pakistan, not just near the LoC.
• Until now, India has consistently framed its actions as retaliation against terrorist infrastructure, targeting:
  • Launch pads (2016),
  • The Balakot training camp (2019),
  • Nine terrorist-linked locations during Operation Sindoor.
• On May 12, PM Narendra Modi introduced a more assertive 'new normal', stating:
  • India has the right to respond militarily to any act of terror,
  • It will not be deterred by nuclear threats or “nuclear blackmail”,
  • India will no longer distinguish between terrorists, their masterminds, and the governments that support them.
• This marks a clear strategic warning to Pakistan’s military establishment: future responses like Operation Sindoor 2.0 may include direct action against state-linked elements.
• Modi’s sharp rhetoric underscores this doctrinal shift:
  • “Terror and talks cannot go together”
  • “Terror and trade cannot go together”
  • “Water and blood cannot flow together”
• These developments signal a hardening of India’s national security policy, aimed at restoring credible deterrence and ending Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear threats to shield terrorism.

Conclusion

By broadening the scope of regular military actions without crossing the nuclear limit, Mr. Modi aims to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. But this will need a big improvement in normal military strength. India must develop skills to neutralize enemy air defences and follow a network-based strategy that smoothly connects both manned and unmanned air systems with satellite-based tools for watching, communication, and targeting. At the same time, India should learn from the intelligence and security failures that caused the Pahalgam incident, so that it can plan, predict, and stop similar events in the future. Only then can the broad ‘new normal’ serve as a real warning to prevent future terrorist attacks.