IAS/UPSC Coaching Institute  

 Editorial 1: ​​​​Turning tides

Context

Pakistan’s internal security cannot be restored through external aggression against Afghanistan.

 

Introduction

The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan (2021) marked a turning point in South Asian geopolitics. For Pakistan, it seemed a strategic success, fulfilling its long-held vision of a friendly regime in Kabul. Yet, the victory soon turned hollow, as the rise of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) reignited cross-border militancy and exposed Pakistan’s contradictory security policies.

 

Background: Taliban’s Return and Pakistan’s Reaction

  • When the Taliban recaptured Kabul in August 2021 after two decades of insurgency, Pakistan perceived it as a tactical victory.
  • Then Prime Minister Imran Khan hailed it as Afghans having “broken the shackles of slavery.”
  • However, this development reinvigorated the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — a group distinct from, but ideologically aligned with, the Afghan Taliban.

 

Rising Militancy within Pakistan

  • Over the past four years, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and adjoining tribal districts have witnessed a sharp rise in militant attacks.
  • In 2025 alone, militancy-related violence claimed over 2,400 lives, according to an Islamabad-based think tank.
  • Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing sanctuary to the TTP, leading to growing cross-border hostilities.

 

Escalation: Air Strikes and Ceasefire

  • On October 9, 2025, while Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi was visiting India, Pakistan launched air strikes in Kabul, allegedly targeting TTP bases.
  • These strikes triggered a week of retaliatory attacks across the border, killing dozens on both sides.
  • fragile ceasefire, brokered by Qatar, eventually brought temporary calm.

 

Shifting Dynamics: From Patron to Adversary

  • During the insurgency years, Pakistan sheltered and supported the Afghan Taliban, expecting loyalty in return.
  • Once in power, however, the Taliban sought independent state-to-state relations, ending the old patron-clientdynamic.
  • This transition exposed deep structural contradictions between Islamabad and Kabul.

 

The TTP Factor and Ideological Spillover

  • The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) oppose:
    • The merger of tribal areas with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
    • The secular structure of the Pakistani state, and
    • The imprisonment of their cadres.
  • Inspired by the Afghan Taliban’s success, the TTP has intensified its insurgency inside Pakistan.

 

Key Flashpoints in Bilateral Relations

  1. Durand Line Dispute:
    • The colonial-era boundary remains unrecognized by Kabul, leading to frequent border clashes.
  2. Refugee Deportations:
    • Pakistan’s decision to expel thousands of Afghan refugees has further strained ties.
  3. India’s Diplomatic Outreach:
    • New Delhi’s cautious engagement with the Taliban regime has heightened Pakistan’s insecurity.

 

Pakistan’s “New Doctrine”

  • By striking targets inside Kabul, Pakistan is setting a precedent — holding the Afghan government directly responsible for cross-border militancy.
  • This approach mirrors India’s post-Uri and Balakot doctrine, which emphasized overwhelming retaliationagainst terrorism.

 

Strategic Miscalculations

  • Pakistan’s current security turmoil is largely self-inflicted:
    • It pursued a contradictory policy — combating terrorism domestically while nurturing militant proxies abroad.
    • Its two-decade support for the Taliban, aimed at gaining “strategic depth” against India, has boomeranged.

 

Conclusion

Pakistan’s Taliban gamble has exposed the dangers of contradictory statecraft — fighting and fostering militancy simultaneously. Air strikes may display strength but cannot resolve structural insecurity. Unless Islamabad reorients its Afghan policy toward stability and cooperation, continued violence and blowback will deepen internal fractures, leaving Pakistan trapped in the very instability it once exported.