Editorial 1: Iran’s n-programme, the illusion of a surgical strike

Context

Iran’s nuclear programme is large and tough, not stopped by a few air strikes; only long-term diplomacy can work.

Introduction

In rising tensions in West Asia, Israel and now the United States attacked Iran’s nuclear sites and top scientists. Iran fought back with drones and missiles, some getting past the Iron Dome defence. As the conflict grows, an important question arises: Can Iran’s nuclear program be stopped by military force? The simple answer is no, or at least not easily. Despite years of effort, using the military against Iran’s nuclear plans is very complicated, limited, and risky.

Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructure and Military Strike Challenges

• Nuclear facilities designed for attack resistance: Uranium enrichment sites like Fordow and Natanz are deep underground.
  • Fordow is buried 80 to 100 meters under a mountain near Qom.
  • Sites are protected by reinforced concrete and steel (RCC).
  • Facilities are hardened with the specific goal to resist air strikes.
• Limitations of conventional weapons: Standard bombs or missiles cannot destroy these underground bunkers.
  • Only bunker-busting bombs with extreme penetration can damage such facilities.
• U.S. bunker-busting capabilities: The GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) is a 30,000-pound bomb.
  • Can penetrate up to 60 meters of earth or 18 meters of reinforced concrete.
  • Requires precise, repeated hits over days for effectiveness.
  • Must be delivered by B-2 Spirit or B-52 Stratofortress bombers (U.S.-only aircraft).
• Israel’s current strike capabilities: Does not have the GBU-57 or bombers to carry it.
  • Uses GBU-28 bombs capable of penetrating 5-6 meters of concrete (~30m earth).
  • Upgraded F-35I stealth fighters for bunker-busting, but limited against deep targets.
  • Can damage but not fully destroy highly fortified sites like Fordow without U.S. help.
• Rebuilding potential: Even if key sites like Natanz and Fordow are damaged, Iran can rebuild quickly.
  • Example: After the 2010 Stuxnet cyberattack, Iran repaired and expanded Natanz.
• Comparison with past Israeli strikes: Successful strikes on Iraq’s Osirak (1981) and Syria’s Al-Kibar (2007).
  • Those targets were above ground, isolated, and early-stage.
  • Iran’s nuclear program is mature, spread out, duplicated, and heavily fortified.
  • Israeli strikes likely failed to destroy Iran’s near-bomb-grade nuclear fuel stores.
• Overall assessment: Israel’s unilateral strike would likely only delay Iran’s program temporarily, not dismantle it.

Comparison of Key Nuclear Sites and Strike Capabilities

Why Israel Seeks U.S. Support Against Iran

• Israeli leaders have often depended on U.S. backing for major military actions against Iran.
• Former U.S. President Donald Trump suggested Israel might get access to advanced U.S. weapons like MOP-class bunker busters.
• In 2020, talks about selling such bombs to Israel resurfaced, but no official transfer has happened yet.
• Even with U.S. help, the logistical and political costs for both countries would be very high.

Challenges of a Military Operation Against Iran

• Operation would need regional airspace access, risking sovereignty violations of countries like Iraq or Saudi Arabia.
• This could trigger a wider regional war.
• Iran could retaliate through proxies such as:
  • Hezbollah in Lebanon
  • Militias in Iraq and Syria
  • Houthi rebels in Yemen
• Direct attacks on Israeli and American assets in the Gulf are also possible.

Iran’s Warning and Retaliation Capability

• Iran has warned of a “crushing” response to any attack on its nuclear sites.
• Its ballistic missile and regional alliance network make this threat credible.
• In April 2024, Iran launched over 300 drones and missiles in response to an Israeli strike in Damascus.
• Although most were intercepted, the attack showed Iran’s ability to challenge Israeli air defences.
• The clear message: Iran will respond strongly to any Israeli strike.

Why Diplomacy Is the Only Real Solution for Iran’s Nuclear Issue

• A full-scale regional war would:
  • Disrupt global oil supplies.
  • Destabilise fragile states.
  • Drag the U.S. and allies into a long, uncertain conflict.
  • Likely fail to meet its main goals.
• Diplomacy, though imperfect, remains the only viable long-term option.
• The 2015 JCPOA deal:
  • Limited Iran’s nuclear program.
  • Allowed international inspections.
• Since the U.S. left in 2018, Iran has:
  • Increased its uranium stockpile to 30 times the allowed limit.
  • Raised enrichment levels to 60%.
  • Reduced cooperation with the IAEA.
• A new nuclear deal will be harder due to:
  • Regional instability.
  • Deep mistrust.
• Still, it is more achievable than a costly war with no guaranteed success.
• The ongoing cycle of attacks and retaliation risks:
  • Greater regional instability.
  • Higher human and economic costs.
• Iran’s nuclear program is a large, hardened, and redundant system, not a single target.
• For Israel and the U.S., a “clean” surgical strike is a dangerous illusion.
• The way forward requires:
  • Diplomatic strategy.
  • Multilateral pressure.
  • Careful verification.
  • Strong deterrence.

Conclusion

Iran’s nuclear program is not only technically advanced but also built strong to survive military attacks. The key lesson from the last 20 years of Middle East policy is this: wars are easy to begin but very hard to finish. If the current attacks grow into a full war, the damage from failure would be disastrous.