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28 Jul 2025 : Understanding Russia’s Taliban gauntlet

Editorial 2: ​Understanding Russia’s Taliban gauntlet

Context

The logic behind Russia’s move to legitimise the Taliban continues to raise questions.

 

Introduction

On July 3, 2025, the Russian Foreign Ministry officially recognised the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), marking the peak of Moscow’s gradual diplomatic engagement with the Taliban. This move came shortly after Russia agreed to upgrade bilateral ties and formally accredited Gul Hassan as the Taliban’s ambassador to Moscow. With the IEA flag now flying over the Afghan Embassy in the Russian capital, many are questioning the strategic motivations behind Russia’s decision to legitimise the Taliban regime.

 

A change, two decades later

Time Period / Event

Russia’s Approach and Actions

Key Highlights

1996–2001: Taliban's First Rule (IEA 1.0)

- Refused to recognise Taliban govt.
- Withdrew embassy in 1997.
- Supported Northern Alliance militarily.
- Helped Central Asian allies secure Afghan borders.

- Taliban seen as hostile.
- Strong anti-Taliban stance.
- Backed anti-Taliban regional coalitions.

2000: Chechnya Conflict

- Taliban recognised Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
- Urged jihad against Russia over Chechnya.
- Estimated 2,500 Chechen fighters trained in Afghanistan.
- Russia considered “preventive strikes”.

- Diplomatic relations hit a low.
- Taliban viewed as direct threat to Russian national security.

Post-9/11 (2001–2003)

- Joined U.S. in UN sanctions against Taliban.
- Supported Operation Enduring Freedom.
- Listed Taliban as a terrorist organisation in 2003.

- Became part of global war on terror.
- Coordinated with U.S. against Taliban.

Early 2010s: Shift in Strategy

- Built unofficial ties with Taliban.
- Strengthened engagement with Pakistan.
- Focused on counter-IS-K effortsand drug control.
- Ensured protection of Russian citizens.

- Gradual pragmatic shift.
- Taliban no longer seen as the sole enemy.

2010s–2020: Diplomatic Balancing

- Balanced between Afghan govt. and Taliban.
- Hosted Moscow Format and intra-Afghan talks.
- Taliban invited despite UN blacklist.
- Sought to increase regional influence.

- Russia emerged as a diplomatic mediator.
- Attempted to sideline U.S. presence.

2021: Taliban Takeover (IEA 2.0)

- Maintained embassy in Kabul.
- Expressed confidence in Taliban governance.
- Continued engagement despite regime change.

- Russia among few to maintain diplomatic continuity.

2022–2024: Growing Security Risks

- IS-K attacks on Russian interests:
- Kabul Embassy bombing (2022)
- Crocus City Hall attack, Moscow (2024)
- Taliban blamed for failing to control terrorism.
- No significant economic gainsdespite engagement.

- Security concerns deepened.
- Economic cooperation remained unfulfilled.
- Afghanistan still seen as potential trade corridor, but uncertainty remains.

 

Russia’s Recognition of the Taliban (IEA)

  • Russia’s decision to recognise the IEA reflects its belief that the Taliban are the only stable force in control of Afghanistan.
  • Moscow sees the Taliban as partners in fighting terrorism, especially against groups like IS-K.
  • This perception led to the suspension of the ban on Taliban activities in April 2025.

 

Legal and Security Concerns Still Remain

  • Despite the recognition, the Russian Supreme Court only suspended, not fully removed, the ban on the Taliban.
  • The Taliban are still listed as a terrorist group in Russia’s unified federal register.
  • This shows that Russia’s security establishment remains cautious, and the decision could be reversed if Taliban cooperation fails.

 

Limited Immediate Gains for Russia

  • The recognition is mostly symbolic, offering no immediate benefits to Russia in Afghanistan.
  • Moscow’s influence in the region may not increase as a result of this move.
  • While some Russian officials talk of arming the Taliban, it is uncertain how far Russia is willing to go in this partnership.

 

Regional Implications and Future Risks

  • Russia’s move may encourage other countries like China and Central Asian states to also recognise the Taliban.
  • The Taliban are expected to demand more from their partners, now that a major power has officially recognised them.
  • Russia’s soft approach to the Taliban’s policies on inclusivity, women, and minority rights may set a pragmatic, value-neutral template for others in the region.

 

Conclusion

India is unlikely to be significantly impacted by Russia’s recent move. New Delhi has gradually strengthened its diplomatic engagement with the Taliban, especially through shared concerns over terrorism in Kashmir. India is expected to maintain dialogue, trade, and humanitarian aid with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), while continuing to withhold formal recognition. This approach of engagement without official recognition appears to remain the central path of India’s Afghanistan policy.