Editorial-1: The Indian Express
US should negotiate a successor to JCPOA with Iran. Now is the time
Context
The American strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan have brought to the fore three major issues: The success of the strikes, the future of Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU), and the nature of US-Israel-Iran dealings going forward.
Introduction
The extent of damage to Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility remains unclear. Twelve GBU-57 bombs, capable of penetrating up to 60 metres, targeted ventilation shafts above the centrifuge hall located 80 metres underground—likely falling short of direct impact. Key concerns include whether concussive shockwaves damaged the underground systems, caused ventilation collapse, harmed personnel, or disrupted power to centrifuges. Iran’s admission of severe damage raises questions over its credibility and strategic intent.
Damage to Fordow and Concerns Over HEU Stockpiles
- If Fordow has effectively been sealed and control over the centrifuges is lost, a direct hit on the centrifuge hall may not matter. The centrifuges will, over time, simply become inoperable. In this sense, the US President may be at least partly right: Fordow may have been obliterated functionally.
- Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), reportedly enriched up to 60% and potentially usable for bomb-making, was stored at Fordow, with around 160 kg at the site and possibly 400 kg in total.
- These stockpiles were likely moved before the strikes, although this is contested by the Trump administration. If relocated, the HEU would have been dispersed across multiple sites to enhance survivability.
- However, considering the intelligence capabilities of the US and Israel, it is likely that the location of the HEU will eventually be discovered. Given past operations against Iranian nuclear scientists and generals, Israel is expected to trace the HEU as well.
Strategic Options and Need for International Oversight
- Once the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is located, the United States and Israel would face strategic choices. Inaction is unlikely, as Iran is believed to be capable of further enriching the HEU at a covert facility within months.
- Military strikes on the HEU carry significant risks, as they could lead to “dirty bomb” effects by dispersing radioactive material without a nuclear explosion. This may provoke global condemnation and could set a precedent endangering Israel’s own nuclear infrastructure.
- A more viable option would be to bring the HEU under international safeguards. This would require Iran to disclose the stockpile locations, enabling access for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the reimplementation of continuous monitoring as provided under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
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Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran’s nuclear deal)
- The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was an agreement between Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and the European Union.
- Its objective was to address the nuclear issue by easing sanctions on Iran in return for strict limits on its nuclear programme. These included reducing the number of centrifuges, capping uranium enrichment at 3.67%, and restricting the low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile to 300 kg.
- Iran adhered to the agreement until the United States, under President Donald Trump, withdrew from it in 2018 and reinstated sanctions.
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Prospects for a New Nuclear Agreement
- For a new deal to be struck on Iran’s nuclear activities, the United States will need to negotiate a successor to the JCPOA. In his comments on the strikes on Iran, US President Donald Trump drew a parallel to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks during World War II, seeming to suggest that Iran is similarly prostrate. In fact, the parallel is far from accurate. Iran is not an occupied country.
- Both sides face limits. The US wants to avoid another “forever war”, not least due to domestic opposition. In addition, its supplies of defensive missiles and other war materials are under stress from provisioning Ukraine and Israel.
- Israel’s famous air defences are strained, perhaps to breaking point, and it will be increasingly vulnerable to retaliatory missile attacks. Iran’s options, too, are limited. Tehran must worry that both Israel and the US will resume attacks, and not just on nuclear facilities, and that internal dissent will boil over.
Conclusion
The conditions are ripe, therefore, for a new nuclear deal. That said, the ceasefire must hold, and Iran must have an authority figure that can deliver a deal. Neither is certain. In addition, the US may have to sweeten the deal economically by lifting sanctions. This will depend on Trump overcoming domestic and Israeli opposition. In short, there is a road ahead, but it is a rocky one.