Editorial 1: Decline of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) in India
Context:
India’s long battle against Left-Wing Extremism appears to be entering its final phase, supported by improved security operations and development-driven governance.
Introduction
Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), popularly associated with the “Red Corridor,” has posed one of India’s most persistent internal security challenges since the 1980s. At its peak (2000–2010), Maoist groups controlled large swathes of tribal and forested regions across Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Bihar, and Maharashtra. The article highlights a major operational success the neutralisation of key Maoist commander Madvi Hidma and reflects on the changing security landscape. Over two decades, coordinated operations, technological support, better policing, and targeted development interventions have gradually reversed Maoists’ influence. Yet, pockets of vulnerability persist, requiring sustained state capacity and community engagement.
Key Issues Discussed in the Editorial
- Historical Evolution of LWE
- Origin traces back to the 1967 Naxalbari uprising under Charu Majumdar.
- The People’s War Group (PWG), founded by Kondapalli Seetharamaiah (1980), dominated operations in Andhra Pradesh and adjoining states.
- In 2004, PWG merged with the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) to form CPI (Maoist)—a turning point that consolidated insurgent strength.
- Peak LWE influence created the so-called “Compact Revolutionary Zone”, envisioned as a corridor stretching from Andhra Pradesh to Nepal.
- Why LWE Expanded (1990s–2010)
- Policy incoherence: Frequent shifts between talks and operations, especially in Andhra Pradesh (e.g., 2004 ceasefire), gave Maoists time to regroup.
- Administrative vacuum: Poor presence of civil administration and policing in remote tribal areas.
- Socio-economic grievances: Land alienation, forest rights violations, lack of basic services.
- State capacity gaps: Police shortages, lightly armed forces, inadequate infrastructure.
- Operational Challenges
- Earlier, postings in LWE areas were treated as “punishment”, reducing morale.
- Lack of training, equipment, and intelligence limited OPS success.
- Gadchiroli police created AC-60 commandos, but larger institutional support was missing.
- Intelligence suffered due to absence of local-language recruits and poor thana networks.
- Turning Point: Strengthened Security Strategy (2014 onwards)
- The editorial notes that a major shift occurred after 2014, when the Centre implemented a structured counter-LWE policy.
- Key Measures (MHA Annual Report 2023–24):
- SAMADHAN doctrine (integrated strategy covering Smart leadership, Aggressive strategy, Motivation, Training, Actionable intelligence, Database, Use of Technology, and No access to financing).
- Security Upgradation Scheme (SUS): Fortified police stations, modern weapons, anti-landmine vehicles.
- Deployment of UAVs/drones, helicopters, and tech-based surveillance.
- Better inter-State coordination, particularly between AP, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Jharkhand, Odisha.
- Outcomes:
- LWE-affected districts reduced from 126 (2010) to 38 (2024), now 11 (2025).
- Violent incidents dropped by over 80% from 2010 levels (MHA).
Role of Development & Governance
- The article highlights the Special Central Assistance (SCA) scheme that fills infrastructure gaps in LWE-hit districts.
- Important developmental pillars (MHA, NITI Aayog)
- Road Connectivity Project for LWE Areas (RRP-I & II)
- Better telecom connectivity (Mobile Towers Project)
- Education & health infrastructure
- Implementation of FRA, PESA, MGNREGA
- Banking & digital access
- Skill training & livelihood initiatives
- The combined effect reduced local support for Maoists, weakened recruitment, and improved state legitimacy.
Current Situation: Why Tables Are Turning?
- Elimination of senior leaders.
- Increased surrender rates among cadres.
- Erosion of safe havens and forest cover dominance.
- Improved intelligence networks through community participation.
- Greater administrative reach through roads, BSNL towers, and panchayat engagement.
Remaining Challenges
- Despite progress:
- Bastar region continues to be the core resistance zone due to dense forests and tribal alienation.
- Concerns regarding human rights violations can undermine trust.
- Inter-state coordination must remain strong, especially in border zones.
- Sustainable development and rights-based governance remain crucial.
Conclusion
India’s two-decade-long struggle against LWE has finally entered a decisive stage, with significant territorial gains and weakened Maoist leadership. Yet sustainable peace demands not just security operations but deep, inclusive development, protection of tribal rights, and constant strengthening of state capacity in the affected regions.