Agreements and Initiatives to Resolve the Border Disputes

AGREEMENTS AND INITIATIVES TO RESOLVE THE BORDER DISPUTES

S himla agreement of 1914: In 1914, a convention was held in Shimla to demarcate the boundary between Tibet and Northeast India, with representatives from Tibet, China, and British India present. Following discussions, an agreement was signed by British India and Tibet, but Chinese officials did not sign it. Today, India recognizes the McMahon Line, established by the Shimla Convention, as the legal boundary between India and China. However, China rejects both the Shimla Agreement and the McMahon Line, arguing that Tibet was not a sovereign state and thus lacked the authority to enter into treaties.

P anchsheel Agreement of 1954: The Panchsheel doctrine clearly indicated the willingness to ‘Respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’. Although we have come a long way since, from 1962 war to the cold peace era of 1962-1989, to the revived tensions of the present, the intent of the doctrine was well directed. It must have acted as a safeguard against any such disputes arising at the first place.

The Five Principles

In the treaty, the leaders of China and India outlined their policy of Panchsheel and defined it through five ideological principles. Those principles are:

M utual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty

Mutual non-aggression

Mutual non-interference

Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit

Peaceful coexistence

According to Nehru and Zhou, China and India’s relationship would be one of respect and peace. Basically, each nation agreed not to mess with the internal affairs of the other and committed them to pursue peaceful solutions to any conflicts that might arise between them.

• In 1989, India-China formed a Joint Working Group for Confidence building measures (CBMs) and agreed to mutually settle all border disputes.

• India-China Agreements regarding the Line of Actual Control (LAC): The LAC is the effective military border which separates Indian controlled areas of Jammu and Kashmir from Aksai Chin. It is to be noted that this border is not a legally recognised international boundary, but rather it is the practical boundary. Conventionally, India considers the Johnson line of 1865, marked by a civil servant W.H. Johnson, which put Aksai Chin in Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand, China recognises the Macartney-Macdonald Line as the actual boundary which puts Aksai Chin in Xinjiang region of China. In 1993, when the then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited China, ‘The Agreement for Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity’ along the LAChas been signed between India and China. In 1996 an agreement took place on Confidence Building Measures in the military field along the LAC.

• In 2003 India and China signed a Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation and also mutually decided to appoint Special Representatives to explore the framework of a boundary settlement from the political perspective. The IndiaChina relations received a major boost in 2003. China recognised India’s sovereignty over Sikkim. This was also followed by a framework of Guiding principles and political parameters to improve bilateral ties. It proposed a three-step resolution to the border disputes:

A bilateral agreement on the laid down principles.

T his was to be followed by an exchange of maps between the two countries.

O nce satisfied with the markings, the final demarcation of borders was to take place.

• In 2005 a protocol was agreed on Modalities for the implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military field along the LAC.

Working mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India China borders:

The WMCC was established in 2012 as an institutional mechanism for consultation and coordination for management of India – China border areas, as well as to exchange views on strengthening communication and cooperation, including between the border security personnel of the two sides.

Composition: It is headed by joint secretary-level officials from both sides. They are entrusted to help the special representative for boundary talks, a position currently held by NSA Ajit Doval.

BORDER PERSONNEL MEETING POINTS

• Border Personnel Meeting points are locations along the disputed Sino-Indian border where the armies of both countries hold ceremonial and practical meetings to resolve border issues and improve relations. While border meetings have been held since the 1990s, the first formal Border Personnel Meeting point was established in 2013.

• There are five meeting points: two in the Indian Union Territory of Ladakh or India’s Western (Northern) sector corresponding to China’s Southern Xinjiang Military District of the Western Theater Command, one in Sikkim, and two in Arunachal Pradesh in India’s Central and Eastern sectors corresponding to China’s Tibet Military District.

Clearly, the policies have not sufficed in realising a solution to the long-standing disputes. A status-quo exists owing to the face-off between differential aspirations of the two nations. While China’s support for resolution of border disputes stands subservient to Tibet issue, India would continue to hold on to the Tibet card unless the border-disputes are resolved. Besides, the changing global and regional picture – from China’s move towards ‘assertive regionalism’, its strengthening ties with Pakistan and its complete disregard for counter-opinions on contentious issues like South-China sea – has only worsened the chances of a quick resolution.

The 1993 agreement:

No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control. In case personnel of one side cross the Line of Actual Control, upon being cautioned by the other side, they shall immediately pull back to their own side of the Line of Actual Control. When necessary, the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the Line of Actual Control where they have different views as to its alignment.”

The 1996 agreement:

“If the border personnel of the two sides come in a face-toface situation due to differences on the alignment of the line of actual control or any other reason, they shall exercise selfrestraint and take all necessary steps to avoid an escalation of the situation. Both sides shall also enter into immediate consultations through diplomatic and/or other available channels to review the situation and prevent any escalation of tension.”

The agreement, also for the first time in India-China rules of engagement, makes it clear that “neither side shall open fire or conduct blast operations within 2 km of the Line of Actual Control”. This is what led to a practice, where troops on both sides, never brandished weapons at each other and at most, indulged in a physical jostle.

The 2013 agreement:

“The two sides agree that they shall not follow or tail patrols of the other side in areas where there is no common understanding of the Line of Actual Control in the IndiaChina border areas.”

China’s track record on adhering to agreed CBMs and protocols on the LAC has been poor in the past few years. Having agreed to establish a hotline between the two military headquarters in 2013, the Chinese side scuttled the proposal by saying its embassy in Delhi should be notified first in case the Indian side wanted to make a call. Then, there were differences on encryption codes and translation arrangements. As a result, a hotline is still to be operationalized despite positive noises from the Indian side.

CHINA STUDY GROUP (CSG)

The CSG is the central and sole advisor to the government on policies related to China, and is currently playing a key role as the two countries try and chalk out a comprehensive disengagement process.

The CSG was set up in November 1975 on the instructions of then-PM Indira Gandhi, comprising the secretaries of external affairs, defence, and home. Its first head was diplomat K.R. Narayanan, who would go on to become President of India.

The primary task of the CSG was to monitor the IndiaChina border, assess its management, and help in preparations for negotiations with China on the border question.

The CSG was subsequently upgraded post 2003, after the establishment of the Special Representatives meetings to resolve the border question with China.

It was also put under the charge of Brajesh Mishra, the NSA at the time, and many top civil servants were brought into it. In the next few years, the CSG was further expanded to include representatives of intelligence agencies.

Currently, the CSG is a secretary-level grouping which includes the foreign secretary, home secretary, defence secretary, and the vice-chiefs of the three services, along with the chiefs of the Intelligence Bureau and R&AW.

The group meets on its own, but the National Security Advisor convenes the meeting from time to time. At such meetings, the service chiefs also attend, and based on the issue at hand, the external affairs minister may also attend